





Against Violence: Emmanuel Lévinas’ Ethical 
Concept and Alain Badiou’s Criticism 
Violence affects all people. Nobody is completely free of it. It could be 
“innocent.” It is such whenever a person loses his or her sensitivity to-
wards the other person, does not care about the other’s opinion, and 
at all costs tries to push some matter, be it ordinary and mundane or 
something of a higher value. However, when such “innocent” actions fall 
on fertile soil, they can lead to an escalation of hate. Wherever violence 
is “normalized,” accepted, or justified, massive exclusion, marginaliza-
tion, and even open conflicts or bloody wars occur. Pro-civilizational 
ideational currents – philosophical, ethical, political, and religious (for 
example, the ideas of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue) – aim at 
the elimination or at the very least a decisive minimalization of violence 
and its derivatives. Increasingly numerous critical conceptions appear 
parallel to them. These are conceptions that not only permit, but in fact 
affirm violence in its various forms. All ideologies, regardless of if they 
are on the left or right side of the political spectrum, permit violence as 
a legitimate means for the realization of aims. It is unimportant if this 
violence is physical or “just” verbal, if it is veiled or “naked,” subtle or 
brutal; violence always consists of stomping on another’s dignity, de-
nying a person the right to his or her own perspective, and denying the 
right to humanity.
A great example of anti-violence philosophical thought that was born 
from the ashes of the tragedy of the Second World War is the work of 
Emmanuel Lévinas. The ethics of radical responsibility he gave rise to 
has become an inspiration for many contemporary authors who, making 
various modifications (not infrequently critical ones), emphasize that 
no form of the instrumentalization of the human person is acceptable. 
In addition to numerous admirers of Lévinas’ conception, there are also 
those who question it in its entirety as being in essence worthless. An 
example of a philosopher who stands in strong opposition to Lévinas is 
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Alain Badiou, the author of the essay Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding 
of Evil. 
The aim of this article is to present the ethical bases of Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ anti-violence conceptions in the contexts of the criticism that 
Badiou presents on the pages of his Ethics. Lévinas’ perspective will be 
briefly presented at the beginning. Next, a series of criticisms as well as 
Badiou’s presumptions will be referred. In the final part, I will make an 
effort to respond to Badiou’s accusations from the perspective of Lévi-
nas’ ethical program. I will at the same time emphasize that the affirma-
tion of violence is an inevitable consequence of Badiou’s ethical project. 
Lévinas
The source of violence is a focus on “I” as well as an aspiratio towards 
absolute affirmation and the construction of a strong identity and indi-
viduality. The philosophical expression of this aspiration is ontological 
discourse. Ontology, as Lévinas understands it, reduces reality to some 
supreme factor, to some form of essence/being, always excluding that 
which does not fir in the framework accepted by it.1 When that which is 
unknown and different transcends the defined categories, it is assimi-
lated and converted into that which does not disrupt the cohesion of the 
system, to something “clear and obvious.” It can never be accepted in its 
incomprehensibility, alterity, or uniqueness. 
According to Lévinas, the entirety of philosophy, beginning in ancient 
Greece and up through contemporary thought, is of an ontological na-
ture; i.e., it is excluding, neutralizing.2 The unity of all truth, the objective 
and subjective path to knowing it, the primacy of absolute, impersonal 
intellectual laws inevitably leads to antagonisms and the consolidation 
of divisions between people. The “reasons” towards which all knowl-
edge strives are not directly given, but always through some supreme 
principle. The latter is the subject of preference and personal acknowl-
edgment. Regardless of what the principle of knowledge is in concreto 
– reason, freedom, I, etc. – it always reveals the due “ontological imperi-
alism” of egology.3 As long as the uniformity-causing knowledge moves 
in the field of subjectiveness, it is not prone to criticism. The problem 
begins when theory claims the right to order human life. As Lévinas 
writes: “As far as the things are concerned, a surrender is carried out in 
their conceptualization. As for man, it can be obtained by the terror that 
1  Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 42.




brings a free man under the domination of another. For the things the 
work of ontology consists in apprehending the individual (which alone 
exists) not in its individuality but in its generality [...].”4 Thus philosophy 
(ontology) presumes the primacy of truth, sanctioning violence. 
Violence is a kind of interpersonal relationship; it is something that 
one person does to another. “[T]he relation of violence,” the French phi-
losopher emphasizes, “does not remain at the Lével of the wholly formal 
conjuncture of relationship. It implies a specific structure of the terms 
in relation. Violence bears upon only a being both graspable and escap-
ing every hold.”5 The assimilation of alterity and the reduction of it to 
that which is “mine” is violence. In other words, an act of violence is an 
attempt at reducing that which is personal, human, and objective to the 
row of impersonal subjectiveness, to a function. The claims of violence 
cannot, however, fully be realized, because humanity in itself eludes all 
attempts at reification. Thus Lévinas emphasizes that violence, which 
grows out of the limitless negation of that which is human, contains 
within itself murderous potential.6 
One cannot oppose the unity-generating violence in any way other 
than through a turn towards a horizon that is completely different from 
the one proposed by the ontological discourse. Contrasting ontology 
with metaphysics, Lévinas says: “Knowledge [violence – W.Z.] would be 
the suppression of the other by the grasp, by the hold, or by the vision 
that grasps before the grasp. In this work metaphysics has an entirely 
different meaning. If its movement leads to the transcendent as such, 
transcendence means not appropriation of what is, but its respect.”7 Un-
like ontology, metaphysics does not strive for unity and the strict regu-
lations resulting from it. That is why there is no room for violence in it. 
On the contrary, the horizon opened by metaphysics is the horizon of the 
absolute alterity of the Other person.
Metaphysics does not allow some elite insight into the alterity of the 
Other; it does not provide some esoteric knowledge on its topic. The Oth-
er always eludes reason. He or she cannot be thematized or described 
with concepts. His or her absolute uniqueness and singularity cannot 
be expressed and, adequately, represented within the framework estab-
lished by the ontological discourse. That which the Other contributes 
along with him or herself can be respected, but it can also be stomped 
on, rejected, or desecrated. Knowledge of the other, extra-contextual, 
and unmediated perception of him or her in the truth about him or her-
4  Ibid., 44.
5  Ibid., 223.
6  Ibid., 238. 
7  Ibid., 302.
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self, in the nakedness of his or her face8 introduces to the dimension of 
Infinity that arouses metaphysical desire. As Lévinas writes:  
The other metaphysically desired is not ‘other’ like the bread I eat, the land 
in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate, like, sometimes, myself for 
myself, this ‘I,’ that ‘other.’ I can ‘feed’ on these realities and to a very great 
extent satisfy myself, as though I had simply been lacking them. The meta-
physical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely 
other.9
That which is absolutely Other is the order of the absolute, transcend-
ent Good. It is a Good that cannot be driven out of the concept of being 
but, on the contrary, being in itself justifies and sanctions it. Thus Lévi-
nas does not aim to reject ontology, but to subjugate it to that which is 
fundamental: metaphysics.10  
Good has a divine status and is one with the Absolute. 
“God is not simply,” Lévinas writes, “the ‘first other,’ or the ‘other par ex-
cellence,’ or the ‘absolutely other,’ but other than the other, other otherwise, 
and other with an alterity prior to the alterity of the other,prior to the ethical 
obligation to the other and different from every neighbor, transcendent to 
the point of absence [...]. This is the confusion wherein substitution for the 
neighbor gains in disinterestedness, that is, in nobility; wherein the tran-
scendence of the Infinite thereby likewise arises in glory.”11
The “God of religion” is not infinite; we cannot pray to Him, talk with 
Him, or turn to Him in difficult life situations. God is an absence, but, if 
this can be said, a positive absence, as He is absent yet obliges to engage 
in the matters of other people. He is a challenge, an impervious surplus 
that establishes the horizon of goodness and justice. Meanwhile, God, to 
put it in this way, plays a solely ethical “function.” Metaphysics is not a 
theory; it does not lead to knowledge. “Metaphysics is enacted in ethical 
relations.”12 It is of a par excellence practical nature. 
Metaphysics is ethics. Lévinas, identifying metaphysics with ethics, 
clearly emphasizes the primacy of practice over theory, the primacy of a 
concrete act over abstract intellectual concepts. That is why metaphys-
ics is born in a situation in which “I” is separated from its aspiration 
8  Ibid., 74–75.
9  Ibid., 33.
10 Ibid., 44.
11  Emmanuel Lévinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 69.
12  Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 79.
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towards confiscation, towards egotism and undertakes responsibility 
for the Other, at the same time becoming a subject in the proper sense. 
“Ethics, here, does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very 
node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibili-
ty.”13 Thus, according to Lévinas, the subject is always “the subject – in 
– summoning;” the essentially open subject; and also somewhat captive, 
permeated by this Other, to whom it is fully subjugated. “The tie with the 
Other is knotted only as responsibility, this moreover, whether accepted 
or refused,” Lévinas notes emphatically.14 
The ontological idea of unity and wholeness, access to which is guar-
anteed through the construction of a possible system, carries with it the 
danger of violence, consisting of the reification and functionalization of 
persons. In order to avoid the degradation of the other person, Lévinas 
adds to his philosophy a dimension of Infinity; its specific “medium” 
is always the Other person, requiring responsibility, which consists of 
constant readiness to take the place of the Other, to take on his or her 
concerns or problems. 
Badiou
Alain Badiou admits that Lévinas’ conception is an important point of re-
ference for contemporary ethical thought. Feminist, anti-racist, pro-im-
migration, and pro-multicultural movements refer to it.15 At the same 
time, these tendencies are not so much an application of Lévinas’ ideas; 
instead, they are “strikingly different.”16 This does not mean, however, 
that Badiou would like to defend some Lévinasian “orthodoxy” in the 
face of its ideological distortions. On the contrary, the author of Ethics, 
standing in open opposition to Lévinas’ conception, questions it at its 
very foundations.   
The main argument against Lévinasian ethics is methodological in 
nature. The suggestive analyses of the author of Totality and Infinity, 
basing on a phenomenological description, the pathetic and hyperbolic 
tone of his statements is, according to Badiou, not enough in order to 
support a thesis so radical as the originary duties of “I” with regards to 
the Other.17 Badiou believes that the only convincing explanation for the 
view proclaiming the unquestionable metaphysical-ethical primacy of 
13  Emmanuel Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. 
Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 95.
14  Ibid., 97.
15  Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hall-
ward (London: Verso Books, 2014), 78.
16  Ibid., 77. 
17  Ibid., 77–78. 
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the Other is that provided by psychoanalysis. And thus, using a psycho-
analytical key, Badiou claims that the identification of I with the Other 
combines narcissism with aggressivity:18 narcissism because the Other 
is to be nothing more than I seen from the outside through one’s own 
self and aggressivity because “I” places in the Other one’s own primeval 
desire for death; one’s own desire for self-destruction.19 “The other,” 
Badiou writes, “always resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an 
originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true.”20
The above argument finds its extension in the statement that the at-
tempt at grounding ethics in an unclear and indefinite transcendental 
dimension is something irrational and therefore invalid and impossible 
to accept. The audacity of Lévinas’ postulates is not supported by verifi-
able experience. The conception contained in Totality and Infinity, which 
requires the acceptance of a religious axiom and thus some form of faith, 
annihilates the philosophical, universal value of the whole construction 
in favor of a quasi-theological discourse.21 Thus it is “art for art’s sake;” 
an impractical, pathetic abstraction that cannot be applied in everyday 
life. Badiou emphatically states: 
What then becomes of this category if we claim to suppress, or mask, its 
religious character, all the while preserving the abstract arrangement of its 
apparent constitution (‘recognition of the other,’ etc.)? The answer is obvi-
ous: a dog’s dinner [de la bouillie pour les chats].22 
Thus Lévinas’ “recognition of the other” in alterity is of a hypocritical 
nature. Alterity is always, out of necessity, defined alterity. In order to 
recognize another person as an “Other,” one has to first establish a series 
of initial conditions. At least a minimal consensus, some community of 
basic values must exist between “myself” and the Other. One cannot af-
firm another if there are no common points between “us.” “As a matter 
of fact, this celebrated ‘other’ is acceptable only if he is a good other – 
which is to say what, exactly, if not the same as us?”23 Respect for dem-
ocratic values, the established social order, respect for man’s inherent 
dignity, and, finally, respect for the very idea of positive otherness are 
the series of conditions that, according to Badiou, another person must 
18  Ibid., 79.
19  Ibid., 79.
20  Ibid., 79.
21  Ibid., 82.
22  Ibid., 83.
23  Ibid., 83.
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accept in order to “become” the Other.24 The Other as such is an empty 
and insignificant concept. 
By accusing Lévinas of making philosophy religious, Badiou openly 
admits to his own perspective: “There is no God. Which also means: 
the One is not. The multiple ‘without-one’ – every multiple being in its 
turn nothing other than a multiple of multiples – is the law of being. The 
only stopping point is the void.”25 Meanwhile, the attitude the author of 
Ethics adopts is metaphysical nihilism; he a priori precludes any perma-
nent point of reference. If the void is the only limitation, this precisely 
means that there are no permanent fundaments and all points of view 
are at their essence worth the same. Inside a being there is unlimited 
pluralism, incidents not bound up with any permanent laws. The only 
factor that could somehow order an infinitely elastic reality is the human 
being.     With regards to the above obser-
vation, the real problem is therefore not the existence of the Other, but 
the existence of a principle that could in reality unite. Infinite Otherness, 
while naturally understood here in the horizontal and not vertical sense, 
exists, constituting the ontological principle and point of departure for 
all reflections. Badiou writes:
Infinite alterity is quite simply what there is. Any experience at all is the 
infinite deployment of infinite differences. Even the apparently reflexive ex-
perience of myself is by no means the intuition of a unity but a labyrinth of 
differentiations [...]. here are as many differences, say, between a Chinese 
peasant and a young Norwegian professional as between myself and any-
body at all, including myself.26 
Therefore, an ethical project that would guarantee at least a minimal 
community of universal, obliging norms that would be binding regard-
less of time and place would be impossible. On the contrary, one should 
assume that there only exists an ethics of certain processes that with the 
engagement and labors of its subjects can be, at least to a certain de-
gree, applied.27 Badiou calls such an ethics the ethics of (some) truths.28 
“[T]here is no heaven of truths.”29 They are born under specific circum-
stances, in an event, and “summon” the subject to realization,30 but not 
like ideas or values that call for their implementation. On the contra-
24  Ibid., 82–83.
25  Ibid., 82–83.
26  Ibid., 82–83.
27  Ibid., 82–83. 
28  Ibid., 99. 
29  Ibid., 99.
30  Ibid., 99.
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ry, the procedure of the truth, that is shaped “tailored” to a situation 
assumes fidelity as well as breaking with it.31 In other words, the aim 
is to maintain a principled orientation towards events that found the 
truth (fidelity) and not fear “local,” dynamic transformations (imma-
nent breaks) in order to transform reality “custom-made” for the initial 
impulse, which Badiou calls the truth, despite the obstacles. Thus truth 
should not be contrasted with falsehoods. Its contents are not prone to 
falsification, but solely depend on the degree of the determination of 
the subjects that decide to implement them. Thus the aim (truth) justi-
fies the means; hence it also legitimizes violence. Hence Badiou claims 
with regards to fidelity: “For example, the politics of the French Maoists 
between 1966 and 1976, which tried to think and practice a fidelity to 
two entangled events: the Cultural Revolution in China, and May ’68 in 
France.”32 
Lévinas and Badiou’s Critique 
Badiou’s critique is superficial and dogmatic. His deep misunderstand-
ing of Lévinas’ intentions has two sources. First of all, for the author of 
Ethics philosophical questions about God are not a problem. The non-ex-
istence of (any) absolute principle is something obvious. Reality is of a 
chaotic, aimless nature. Every attempt at a serious intellectual propo-
sition should begin with such a statement. Second, Badiou completely 
avoids the context from which the thought of Lévinas has arisen: the 
context of the ideology of hatred, which is personified by concentration 
camps, for instance. Radical responsibility for the Other, unconditional 
good that “I” owe the other, is nothing other than a response to the esca-
lation of unifying violence. Thus the reduction of Lévinasian thought to 
a catalogue of religious statements is something unwarranted. 
Badiou accuses Lévinas of a lack of ontological basis that justifies the 
thesis about the originary opening of the subject to the Other, calling for 
radical responsibility. This argument is unsuccessful because Lévinas in 
fact breaks with ontology. 
“Ontology,” Lévinas writes, “which reduces the other to the same, promotes 
freedom – the freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing 
itself to be alienated by the other. The relation with Being that is enacted 
as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend or 
grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction 
31  Ibid., 99.
32  Ibid., 99.
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of of the other to the same. [...] Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy 
of power.”33
Thus, paradoxically, the attempt at proving the primacy of the Oth-
er is in reality its cancellation. The justification is that which cannot 
be understood by oneself. However, the “superiority” of the Other over 
“I” is something absolute that cannot be subject to relativization. The 
Other does not persuade for him or herself and does not negotiate, but 
demands recognition in his or her alterity. There is no mediating factor 
between “I” and the Other. There is no mediating principle. There is 
only speech that summons “me” to myself.34 It is his or her calling that 
is recognized in the direct presence of his or her face. It is precisely 
through his or her face that the Other most fully confirms, so to say, his 
or her absolute otherness and independence from “I” and its notions.35 
Respect, recognition, and commitment are not demanded accordingly 
through some abstract idea of “the other in me,” but another, autono-
mous, specific person.        
Apart from any calculation or interest, the Other “gives” him or her-
self to the Ego in his or her alterity, creating an inalienable bond of re-
sponsibility. That is why the attempt at psychoanalytic reductionism 
that Badiou applies misses the point and is inappropriate. The Other is 
something radically external with regards to “I.” The distance separating 
the Ego from the Other is infinite. The responsibility for the Other is not 
a camouflaged version of aggression. A turn in its direction, recogni-
tion of the Other is also not an example of narcissism. On the contrary, 
it attests to the desire of Infinity, which, being goodness, confirms its 
transcendent, non-ontological origin. Infinity is something par excellence 
metaphysical. One cannot experience or define it, but only desire it, at-
testing to one’s own conduct in its name.36     
   
For Badiou, the Horizon of the desired, inaccessible Infinity is some-
thing non-philosophical, a nullifying philosophy.37 Behind this rests the 
assumption according to which philosophy as such must remain athe-
istic, independent of any relationship to a broadly understood religious 
dimension. But does a personal, atheistic credo that resolutely and in 
one sentence “deals with” the existence of God annul what Lévinas has 
to say with respect to the relationship between the Other and Infinity? 
33  Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 42–46.
34  Ibid., 49–50.
35  Ibid., 50.
36  Lévinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 73–74.
37  Badiou, Ethics, 79.
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The idea of Infinity, which the Other reveals in the directness of his or 
her summons, is something that at least gives food for thought. As Lévi-
nas writes: 
Biological human fraternity, considered with the sober coldness of Cain, is 
not a sufficient reason that I be responsible for a separated being. The sober, 
Cain-like coldness consists in reflecting on responsibility from the stand-
point of freedom or according to a contract. Yet responsibility for the other 
comes from what is prior to my freedom.38
Faith in the rationality of humanity as well as the freedom that follows 
it is not enough to overcome the power of violence. Conceived ethics is 
always a kind of agreement. The latter requires some necessary precon-
ditions that must first be intellectually approved and later confirmed by 
personal choice. Meanwhile, ethics–metaphysics precedes all choices. It 
is something absolute. Its aim is not to establish socially binding norms, 
which protect and guarantee the equality of civic rights. It cannot be cod-
ified. On the contrary, “I” owes everything to the Other in a completely 
disinterested and irreclaimable way; the Other owes nothing to “I” and 
the possible reciprocity from his or her side is solely his or her matter. 
That is the source of the next accusation of Badiou, who considers 
Lévinas’ ethics to be abstract and not corresponding to reality. It appears 
that this argument is the most difficult to rebut. Lévinas’ theses are 
without a doubt extreme and, it seems, have little to do with so-called 
common sense. Of course, we can note that in his writings the author 
of Totality and Infinity makes use of hyperbole, but from a philosophical 
perspective this argument is not fully convincing; in any case, it requires 
supplement. Lévinas himself responds to a similar accusation as follows:
One can appear scandalized by this utopian and, for an I, inhuman concep-
tion. But the humanity of the human – the true life – is absent. The humanity 
in historical and objective being, the very breakthrough of the subjective, 
of the human psychism in in its original vigilance or sobering up, is being 
which undoes its condition of being: disinterestedness. [...] It is I who sup-
port the Other and am responsible for him. [...] My responsibility is untrans-
ferable, no one could replace me.39 
Responsibility is the keyword here. Without the concept of responsi-
bility, one cannot understand the essence of Lévinasian ethics. Badiou’s 
criticism, which focuses on the religious aspect, completely misunder-
38  Lévinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 71.
39  Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, 100.
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stood the cardinal function of responsibility in Lévinas’ ethical project. 
The Other is not only the “good” Other, the Other who is like myself, 
as Badiou claims. The Other summons to the radicalism of responsi-
bility even when, from the perspective of common sense, he or she is 
the “bad” or “unworthy” Other. The Other is the Other. Not only is this 
unnecessary, but this does not even have to be theoretically substantiat-
ed. Effectiveness is not the purpose of responsibility; its measure is not 
effectiveness. 
The responsibility of “I” knows no measure. When translating Lévi-
nas’ intention from the Lével of hyperbole to everyday practice, one 
should emphasize that “I” is really responsible for everything, for those 
who are physically close as well as those whom we will never meet but 
suffer: because of exploitation, war, disease, and everyday injustices. 
Responsibility is that which awakens, which does not allow the Ego to 
sleep calmly, carelessly enjoying the calm, as “Others do not concern 
me.” There is no situation that would not affect the Ego, be it the war in 
Ukraine, famine in Sub-Saharan Africa, or persecutions in North Korea, 
whomever they would concern. “Each of us is guilty before everyone, 
for everyone and for everything, and I more than the others,”40 Lévinas 
quotes Dostoevsky. This does not always have to be a specific possibility 
of acting on behalf of the Other; perhaps sometimes an ordinary, cogni-
zant act of disagreement or solidarity is enough. 
Lévinas’ thought undoubtedly comes from the trauma of the Holo-
caust, which the philosopher directly witnessed. Concern for every per-
son, every Other, and responsibility for his or her life irrespective of his 
or her condition, position, origins, or views is what he defends against 
the possibility of disdain. This disdain’s historical apogee took place in 
the years 1933-1945, when the Nazi ideology was implemented. The most 
serious argument against Badiou comes along here. Do not the assump-
tions of the Nazi ideology meet the formal condition of truthfulness (as 
understood by Badiou)? If it is met by French Maoists, for example, in 
the name of what would we deny Nazi ideas the right to truthfulness? If 
the void is the only limitation, then it is difficult to offer rationally justi-
fied resistance to the hateful demands of the German National Socialism 
of that period. One can oppose it with another truth, one’s “own truth,” 
and in its name fight “Hitler’s truth.” However, according to Badiou the 
truth that is fought against is not falsehood and lies, but merely “another 
truth.” With regards to this, the only source of hope can be nothing other 
than violence, of which Badiou undoubtedly approves as a legitimate 
means for the implementation of the process of truth. 
40  Lévinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 71.
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***
According to Alain Badiou, Emmanuel Lévinas’ ethical project is not a 
serious philosophical proposition. Badiou himself adopts the attitude 
of metaphysical nihilism in which being “right” is always the domain 
of the stronger, the one who – with the aid of all resources – succeeds 
in imposing others one’s own perspective, which the philosopher calls 
truth. “There is not, in fact, one single Subject, but as many subjects as 
there are truths, and as many subjective types as there are procedures of 
truths.”41 There does not exist any ontologically grounded strong Identity 
or subjectivity. The subject is that which succeeds in breaking into the 
so-called procedure of truth. Thus multiplicity is the point of departure 
and (some!) unity is the possible destination. Meanwhile, Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ though is radically anti-violence at its core. Every person her-
alds a positive and at the same time unnamed and inaccessible Infinity, 
at the same time summoning “me” to “revalue all values” and undertake 
responsibility not subject to calculation. Every person is not only “a val-
ue in and of him or herself,” but is also “the highest value.” The other is 
absolute. Hence the ethics – that is, the philosophy – of the moral act 
establishes the horizon of metaphysical questions. All questions: “Why?” 
“How?” “What for?” only find one response: for the Other. Infinity ver-
sus nothingness, alterity versus unity, good and responsibility versus 
violence and (in)fidelity to (some!) truth: this is Lévinas versus Badiou. 
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Przeciwko przemocy. Etyczna koncepcja Emmanuela Lévinasa wobec 
krytyki Alaina Badiou 
Abstrakt
Artykuł jest przedstawieniem metafizyczno-etycznej myśli Emmanuela Lévina-
sa w kontekście relatywistyczno-ateistycznej krytyki autorstwa Alaina Badiou. 
41 Badiou, Ethics, 81.
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Według Badiou, etyczna koncepcja Lévinasa, odwołująca się do radykalnej, nie-
kończonej Inności drugiego człowieka, jest czymś absurdalnym i niemożliwym 
do realizacji. W części pierwszej pokróte przedstawiam najważniejsze założenia 
Lévinasowskie. W części drugiej referuję krytyczne argumenty, które Badiou 
wystosował rzeciwko Lévinasowi na kartach swojej Etyki. W części ostatniej, 
uznając słuszność perspktywy Lévinasa, odpieram zarzuty Badiou zaznaczając, 
iż zgoda z Badiou oznacza etyczne uprawomocnienie przemocy. 
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Against Violence: Emmanuel Lévinas’ Ethical Concept and Alain 
Badiou’s Criticism
Summary
The article is a description of Emmanuel Lévinas’ metaphysical-ethical thought 
in the context of relativistic-atheistic criticism by Alain Badiou. According to 
Badiou, Lévinas’ ethical concept, which refers to the radical, Infinite Otherness 
of the another human being, is something absurd and impossible to implement. 
In the first part of the article I briefly present the most important assumptions 
of Lévinas. In the second part I present the critical arguments that Badiou made 
against Lévinas in his Ethics. In the last part, agreeing with the Lévinas’s per-
spective, I reject Badiou’s allegations, pointing out that agreement with Badiou 
means that violence has an ethical legitimacy.
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